Pojman

Recall...

Evil: Essential characteristics

Evil involves a breakdown in some kind of ordinary moral functioning.

Question: What if there's no such thing as “ordinary” moral functioning?

There are many behaviors that we think of as moral, which are ordinary in our society but not in all others.

Example: Monogamy.

Hoo boy.

So, from what I can tell, fair to say that this is held up as an ethical ideal by many in the contemporary United States - some influenced by interpretations of e.g. Corinthians and certain parts of the old testament.

But, at least prior to the arrival of the Roman empire in Briton, it was common for one woman to have several husbands (at least according to Julius Caesar). In the United States, the Church of Latter Day Saints practiced polygamy until around 1890.

Extremely varied attitudes about marriage and sexual fidelity can be found in a survey of cultures around the world and through history.

Can any of these attitudes be “the right one”?

What would that even mean?

One hypothesis.

Cultural Moral Relativism

The theory that morality is relative to culture (like politeness).

So, just as it's correct to say “it is polite to smile at strangers” when speaking about the US, and it's not correct to say this when speaking about Russia, maybe it's correct to say “marriage should be between two people” in the US, but not correct in ancient Briton.

Maybe monogamy is moral relative to the contemporary United States, but polyandry was moral relative to ancient Briton.

This way, everybody is right!

or maybe nobody is?

This lets us avoid disagreeing about whether monogamy or polyandry is morally ideal (or whether both are morally permissible, or maybe neither)

It also lets us avoid the frightening question of what we even mean when we say that one social practice is right, or good, and another is wrong, or bad.

That makes the view tempting.

But we should always be careful of easy views.

How troubled men of our time are by this question of judgment (or, as is often said, by people who dare “sit in judgment”) has emerged in the controversy over the present book… What has come to light is neither nihilism nor cynicism, as one might have expected, but a quite extraordinary confusion over elementary questions of morality - as if an instinct in such matters were truly the last thing to be taken for granted in our time. Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem

Could we just be running away from our confusion?

Seems like we need to carefully evaluate Cultural Moral Relativism.

Who's To Judge?

The basic argument for Relativism (according to Pojman):

1. What is considered morally right and wrong varies from society to society, so that there are no moral principles accepted by all societies.
2. All moral principles derive their validity from cultural acceptance.
3. Therefore, there are no universally valid moral principles, objective standards which apply to all people everywhere and at all times.

The Diversity Thesis

What is considered morally right and wrong varies from society to society, so that there are no moral principles accepted by all societies.

The Dependence Thesis

All moral principles derive their validity from cultural acceptance.

In favor of the diversity thesis: there is a lot of cultural variation. Anthropologists will give you many examples.

What does the dependence thesis say?

It's different from the diversity thesis.

It's not just saying that what you believe about morality depends on culture.

It's saying that the only kind of truth a moral principle can have is being accepted by a culture.

In favor of the dependence thesis: it resolves our confusion about what it means to say that a moral principle is true, or valid. When we say this, we're saying something about what some culture we're thinking of accepts.

Some Problems with Relativism

The Problem of Comparison

There’s no sense in comparing two sets of politeness customs, and declaring one “more polite” overall.

This is because there’s no standard of politeness outside of the customs that could be an impartial judge between the two.

If morality is culturally relative in the same way as politeness, then there’s no standard of morality outside of custom that we can use to declare one culture’s practice ethically better than another’s.

Hey, but isn't that a good thing?

Who am I to judge?

The Problem of Tolerance

You might think that Relativism promotes tolerance.

But it doesn't, really.

Some cultures value tolerance. Others don't.

The Problem of Progress

We might want to say that we’ve in some small ways made progress as a culture.

E.g. abandoning the duel as a way of settling differences.

But progress here means: this norm accepted by our present culture is better than a norm accepted by our past culture.

And that’s a cross-cultural comparison.

The Problem of Reformers

We sometimes want to say that someone is morally right to break with their culture's moral standards.

Can you do this with politeness?

If “morally right” just means “fits with the standards of this culture” then it’s a contradiction in terms for something to be morally right and to not fit with the standards of the culture.

The Problem of Intersectionality

What does it even mean to belong to a culture?

Could there be a society of one?

What about the Diversity Thesis?

Even if the consequences of cultural relativism seem unacceptable, we still have the fact that cultures have different norms.

Do we then have to say that there some cultures are right, and others are wrong about, for example, monogamy?

Not necessarily

(although if we're not relativists, we do think that there's something to be said).

Recall:

The Dependence Thesis

All moral principles derive their validity from cultural acceptance.

Maybe this seemed plausible because:

The Weak Dependence Thesis

How best to express and act on moral principles varies with culture and circumstance.

For example, the same fundamental principle of respecting others might be expressed by different rituals in different cultures.

In a time of plenty, leaving a meal unfinished might express discipline.

In a time of famine, leaving a meal unfinished might express carelessness.

However, if we reject moral relativism, then (even if we accept the weak dependence thesis):

1. It is possible for a culture to accept as morally right practices that are wrong.
2. It is possible for a culture to accept as morally right practices that are morally indifferent (neither right or wrong).

We also have no easy answer to our question from before.

What does it even mean to say an action, or practice, norm, is wrong?