Recall...

Our problem from last time.

Should we be investigating evil by looking at what philosophers say?

Or should we look at what psychologists say?

We looked at one interesting example of a psychological experiment that's generally thought to offer some support to Arendt's (second) theory of evil.

This was The Milgram Experiment.

But we ran into a little trouble.

Milgram seems to be motived by his own values.

Futhermore, his values seem to inform his interpretation of his results.

Is his research objective enough to count as scientific?

How does science have to be objective?

If the answer means that science can never tell us anything about values, then we probably aren't going to get anything helpful out of psychology, when it comes to understanding evil.

So, let's ask:

What is Scientific Objectivity?

Does it mean science can never tell us anything about morality?

It would seem so, if objectivity is understood to mean Neutrality

Neutrality

The requirement that scientific theories neither presuppose nor support any moral, political, social, or cultural values.

We talked a little bit about this last time.

This time, let's go deeper.

Why would you want science to be neutral?

Well, there are many disturbing attempts from history to use science to futher terrible political agendas. Generally, the resulting science is bad.

Example:

Lysenkoism

Trofim Denisovich Lysenko

Midcentury Soviet Biologist and Agronomist

Advanced a series of biological theories that emphasized cooperation within and across species, attempting to offer an alternative to Mendelian and Darwinian accounts, which he thought were too focused on competition.

Also held that the traits that an indvidual acquires during its lifetime are passed down to offspring, and that a population of one plant species can be transformed into to another under the right conditions.

These theories were appealing to Soviet authorities.

Under Stalin, thousands of biologists were dismissed, imprisoned, or excuted because of their opposition to Lysenkoism.

Lysenkoist methods included forbidding fertilizer and pesticides, in order to toughen up plants, and planting seeds tightly, in order to let them cooperate.

Adoption of such methods was a contributing factor in soviet famines during the 1930s (7 million dead), and the Great Chinese Famine, 1958-62, (tens of millions dead).

So - the integrity of scientific objectivity is not just a speculative problem.

But can science be neutral?

Problem one:

Without using values, how do you even decide what to study?

Why study cancer in humans, rather than in horses?

Well, values.

OK, but maybe we need to make some distinctions.

Phases of research (According to Max Weber):

1. Choice of problem
2. Gathering of evidence
3. Elevation of a hypothesis or theory supported by the evidence
4. Application of results

Maybe values are OK in choosing our problems (1), and our applications (4), but not in gathering evidence (2) or choosing what theory the evidence supports (3).

Problem two:

Can you really decide what theory some evidence supports, without values?

For example: Milgram held that his experimental findings show that a surprisingly large portion of people are blind followers under the right conditions.

Critics have suggested that in fact, Milgram's evidence supports the idea that people are willing to inflict pain in service of what they see as social ideals (scientific progress), but not as a response to mere authority.

Which is it?

The right answer is “underdetermined” by the evidence.

What do we do when two theories are both compatible with our our best evidence?

If we can't break the tie (and sometimes we can't), we go with the simpler, more elegant, more explanatory theory.

But doesn't that involve using values?

A preference for simplicity and elegance is a kind of value judgement.

OK, but maybe we need to make some distinctions.

Distinguish between:

1. Social and Moral Values: the vaue of democracy, the value of kindness, etc...
2. Epistemic Values: the value of simplicity, the value of explanatory power.

Maybe explanatory values are OK, but social and moral values are not.

But:

Can you really draw the line between these two kinds of values?

AND

Can you do good science without thinking about moral values?

For example: standards of evaluation for evidence might shift, depending on whether you're doing medical research or determining the durability of a new kind of paint.

Is it really wrong to demand a higher standard of evidence for safety when it comes to something we value more (human health) rather than less (paint durability)?

OK, so what about Lysenko?

Well, here's the thing.

Maybe, when we condemn him, we're letting ourselves off the hook too easily.

If values play a role in some good science, then maybe the difference between good science and bad science isn't a lack of neutrality.

But then what is it?

A question for another time.

For now, let's just leave open the possibility that science and ethics have a little bit to teach each other.