Recall...

Earlier Question: Why evil? How does it originate?

We have various theories coming from the history of philosophy.

These historical theories seem, often, more like theories of badness

But maybe badness is a precondition of evil.

For example, within Arendt's work on Eichmann:

Arendt's Second Theory of Evil

(Banal) evil is extreme wrongdoing, resulting from a well-integrated incapacity for moral reflection and judgment in an otherwise healthy person.

The well-integrated incapacity for moral reflection here is key.

A kind of low-grade badness, resulting in evil under the right conditions.

Many of the theories of the origins of evil that we've discussed are, ultimately, theories about:

1. Emotion
2. Human development and education
3. Hypothetical human behavior

Question: isn't this just psychology?

They're also theories about human nature.

Including the more-than-mechanical explanations of our actions.

But they're obviously close.

Maybe we've been going about this wrong?

Maybe science, not philosophy, is the right place to ask questions about evil.

A Case Study: The Milgram Experiment

Setup

A “Teacher” and a “Learner” collaborate on a word-memorization task, as part of a study in the Yale department of psychology

“Teacher” administers electric shocks to “Learner” as punishment for errors.

The electric shocks become agonizing, then lifethreatening, but a scientist tells teacher that they must go on.

In fact, “Learner” is an actor. The real experiment is to see how far “Teacher” will go.

In Milgram's original experiment, 26 out of 40 subjects administered a 450 volt shock, even after the learner had apparently lost consciousness.

Additional details from later studies:

In a set up where the “Teacher” sees two actors refuse to comply, 37 out of 40 refuse to comply.

In a set up where the “Teacher” reads questions while another person administers the shocks, 37 out of 40 comply.

What to make of this?

Milgram:

The essence of obedience is that a person comes to view himself as the instrument for carrying out another person’s wishes, and he therefore no longer regards himself as responsible for his actions. Once this critical shift of viewpoint has occurred, all of the essential features of obedience follow.

The most far-reaching consequence is that the person feels responsible to the authority directing him but feels no responsibility for the content of the actions that the authority prescribes. Morality does not disappear—it acquires a radically different focus: the subordinate person feels shame or pride depending on how adequately he has performed the actions called for by authority.

This suggests many qustions about:

1. The moral emotions of compassion and shame/pride
2. The role of bad faith in evil obedience
3. The moral status of evil-doers, and the problem of moral luck

But we're not going to talk about that stuff (just yet).

Let's ask a different question:

Is this science?

Hrm.

On the one hand, there was an experiment.

On the other hand…

Milgram is not entirely objective, in some sense. He clearly cares deeply about the outcome of these experiments. He is motivated to perform them because of his desire to understand the Holocaust (inspired Hannah Arendt).

Furthermore, Milgram's conclusions purport to tell us something important about morality, which we commonly think lies outside of the realm of scientific investigation.

“objective, in some sense”

How is science objective?

Two candidate ideas:

Neutrality

The requirement that scientific theories neither presuppose nor support any moral, political, social, or cultural values.

Can we really ask of science that it be neutral?

Seems almost impossible.

For one thing, scientists are human beings.

For another, this means that lots of the things we care about the most are off-limits.

Milgram's experiments: probably not neutral.

But:

Impartiality

The requirement that theories be evaluated on the basis of evidence, and on the basis of scientific values like simplicity, parsimony, explanatory power, elegance…

Milgram's experiments certain are an attempt to evaluate a theory on the basis of empirical evidence.

But, Xunzi also attemted to evaluate a theory on the basis of empirical evidence. So did Mengzi.

So what makes what they're doing Philosophy and what Milgram does Science?

Other than the lab coats and stuff.

Demarcation Problem

How do you draw the line between science and everything else?

(Due to Karl Popper)

History of philosophy of science in 20th century is in some sense a series of attempts to answer this question.

Our idea that science could be Neutral perhaps has something to do with some of the more extreme attempts to answer this question.

Maybe all that science can do is record observations, and make guesses about what future observations will be recorded, never going beyond the data to ask "why?".

Another possibility: There's no line.

Maybe science, and philosophy (and a lot of other things too) are like different countries on a map, with some cities clearly in one realm, but some territories disputed and some people living peacefully in border-lands where it doesn't really matter who is in charge.

Scientists who care about "why" are welcome to set up near the border, to freely trade ideas with philosophy and to adopt some philosophical customs.

Philosophers who care about "how" are similarly free to be a bit "international".

As we continue to explore the psychology of evil, let's keep thinking about these questions.