Recall...

We're interested in what philosophy can learn from psychology about the concept of evil

We want to learn what psychologists have to say about moral cognition, because one of the essential characteristics of Evil seems to be a breakdown in ordinary moral cognition.

So,

1. By studying evil, we shed light on moral cognition.
2. By studying breakdowns in moral cognition, we shed light on evil.

Last time, we discussed the widely recognized pheonomenon of alcohol-related crime and violence.

The phenomenon is puzzling, because alcohol is a depressent (it literally makes your neurons less likely to fire, by activating GABA receptors)

But violence and crime are not things that we naturally associate with a sleepy or relaxed state.

More generally, the wide range of behaviors associated with alcohol are puzzling.

How does one drug have so many different effects?

A promising answer seems to be that some of the first systems in the brain to be impaired by alcohol are the behavior inhibition systems: the “editors”, or the “football defense”, that ordinarily blocks impulses and reactions that would be bad for us.

This picture is supported by some experimental evidence:

1. Stop-Go tasks
2. The Stroop task

So what alcohol does is impairs these systems—more ideas that would ordinarily be shot down get through, and other kinds of disregulation occur.

But because impulses vary by person, and reactions vary by situation, the behavioral expression of the impairment varies wildly.

Mystery solved! 🎉

Ethical Implications

OK, what does this mean for our understanding of how moral judgement works?

Remember, from last time, there are two big-picture ideas.

Sentimentalism

Moral Judgement is some form of emotional reaction.

Rationalism

Moral Judgement is the conclusion of a (perhaps unconscious) reasoning process.

What does alcohol tell us about rationalism versus sentimentalism?

Classical sentimentalists (David Hume, Adam Smith) think that moral judgement is all about sympathy: an impulse that produces certain motives, rather than any kind of deliberate self-control.

Modern-day sentimentalists (Greene, Haidt) tend to clarify what kind of emotional reaction they have in mind like this:

The brain has two main cognitive styles: system 1, and system 2 styles.

System 1 cognition is fast, unconscious, automatic, and effortless.

Think of recognizing a face.

System 2 cognition is slow, conscious, deliberate, and effortful.

Think of doing long division.

The modern day version of sentimentalism says that (normal) moral judgement is a system 1 process.

The trouble for modern-day sentimentalism is that alcohol tends to cause trouble for system 2 processes, but not so much for system 1.

So—rationalism?

One more experiment.

rTMS: Repetitive Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation

Neuroeconomist Daria Knotch showed that rTMS, applied to a certain part of the brain associated with self-control, caused people to behave more selfishly in some economic contexts.

This fits with the idea that morality engages behavior inhibition systems.

However, rTMS subjects' ability to assess fairness and unfairness was unimpaired.

This suggests that the behavior inhibition system that prevents selfishness is different from the mechanism that assesses fairness.

Seems like we can pull apart “willpower” or “self-discipline” and “mere calculation”, our ability to assess what's true and what's false.

The authors of this week's reading suggest that this supports an entirely new semi-rationalist theory.

Ordinary old-fashioned rationalism is like this:

REASONING → MORALITY

(Where the arrow means "depends on", so MORALITY depends on REASONING)

The alternative picture is like this:

EXECUTIVE CONTROL → REASONING

EXECUTIVE CONTROL → MORALITY

Both reasoning and moral jugement depend on an executive control system which can be impaired by alcohol, and which is involved in system 2 type processes.

However, morality doesn't depend on ordinary reasoning or vice-versa.

Instead, ordinary morality is mostly self-control and willpower—well-functioing “behavior inhibition systems”—rather than a sophisticated ability to apply rules or reason about behavior.

Emotion does have a role to play.

Basically, the systems that are impaired by alcohol are the “front line” in producing moral behavior. They're responsible for most of it.

But, not everybody who gets drunk gets into bar fights.

Cultivating certain kinds of moral emotions, and trying to reduce others can be a good fallback, for when the “front line” defenses fail.

Evaluation

Is this true?

I think one central question to ask, is: what's the relationship between:

1. what's required for moral behavior, and
2. genuine morality?

An idea from Immanuel Kant:

Nothing in the world—or out of it!—can possibly be conceived that could be called ‘good’ without qualification except a good will. Mental talents such as intelligence, wit, and judgment, and temperaments such as courage, resoluteness, and perseverance are doubtless in many ways good and desirable; but they can become extremely bad and harmful if a person’s character isn’t good…”

Even if self-control makes moral behavior possible, is self-control really sufficent for morality?

Kant’s Shopkeeper

Imagine a shopkeeper, who is meticulously honest and kind, because it is good for business.

If they thought they could get away with it, they'd swindle left and right, and spit in the eye of most of their customers.

But they never succumb to that temptation, because they know they'd be punished.

Kant says: although this shopkeeper does the right things, their actions have no moral worth, because the motive is wrong.

Their actions also seem to involve a lot of self-control. And, it's self-control that's being exercised to produce behavior that conforms to moral rules. Yet, the behavior has no moral worth.

Where is moral worth to be found?

Xunzi: by being motivated by the right kind of moral emotions, felt under the right conditions.

Kant would object.

Here's a slightly updated version of his objection.

Imagine that you experience a great sense of moral pleasure when you care for children.

This feeling is so good that you have children of your own, and care for them.

But if that feeling were to go away at any moment (it doesn't, but if it did), you would abandon your children. After all, what's the point of being good, other than feeling moral pleasure?

Are you a good person?

Kant says no.

Pleasure, even pleasure from moral emotions, isn't the right kind of motive for moral action.

So where is moral worth to be found?

Kant: by being motivated by a recognition of your moral duty.

But:

Imagine you are sick in the hospital.

An acquaintance comes in to check on you.

You think “This is a real friend, this person must really care about me.”

You say as much, and they say

“No no! I'm just doing what I think is my moral duty”

And when you press them on this, they mean it literally. They don't feel anything for you—they certainly don't feel any sadness about your state, or any hope that you'll recover. They just think that it's a rule that you should follow up with people who go to the hospital, and they're not one to break a rule.

Is that a good person?

So where, at last, is moral worth to be found?